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Formulary Apportionment and 
International Tax Rules 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Zachée Pouga Tinhaga
Any proposal to adopt unitary taxation (UT) of multinationals has to 
contend with whether such taxation is compatible with existing international 
tax rules, and, in particular, with the bilateral tax treaty network. Indeed, 
some researchers have argued that the separate accounting (SA) method 
and the arm’s length standard (ALS), introduced in the early twentieth 
century,1 are so embodied in the treaties that they form part of customary 
international law, and are binding even in the absence of a treaty. We 
disagree, because the unitary approach is just as widely embodied in most 
of the current international tax treaties, and, where there are no treaties, 
national laws allow for a unitary approach to taxation. In this chapter we will 
argue that UT can be compatible with most existing tax treaties, and that 
developing countries, in particular, can implement it in most cases with or 
without a tax treaty and in accordance with their domestic laws.
UT and the existing treaty network
Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of  the treaties, which 
assumes the SA method because it addresses the commercial or financial 
relations between associated enterprises.2 Initially, the term permanent 
establishment (PE) was meant to include separate entities (subsidiaries). 
However, in 1933 the League of  Nations introduced Article 5, ancestor 
to the current Article 9 of  the Model,3 where separate enterprises were 
no longer considered PEs. If  UT were adopted, Article 9 would become 
irrelevant in those situations to which UT applies (i.e. where a unitary 
business is found to exist), because UT ignores the transactions between 
related parties, and treats them instead as part of  a single enterprise.
Instead, UT would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7), 
‘[t]he fact that a company that is a resident of  a Contracting State 
controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of  the other 
Contracting State… shall not of  itself  constitute either company a 
permanent establishment of  the other’. However, it is well established 
that a dependent agent can be a PE (see Art. 5(5)), and whether an 
agent is dependent is based on whether the principal exercises legal and 
economic control over the agent.4 ‘An agent that is subject to detailed 
instructions regarding the conduct of  its operations or comprehensive 
control by the enterprise is not legally independent’.5
Chapter 4
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In the case of  a modern, integrated multinational enterprise (MNE) 
that operates as a unitary business, a strong argument can be made 
in most cases that the parent of  the MNE exercises both legal and 
economic control over the operations of  the subsidiaries, especially 
where the subsidiaries bear no real risk of  loss, and acquire goods and 
services exclusively or almost exclusively from the parent or other related 
corporations. The existence of  Intranets in most MNEs has resulted in 
most important operational decisions being centralised. In that case, the 
subsidiaries should be regarded as dependent agents of  the parent. Such 
a finding is in fact made with increasing frequency in both developed and 
developing countries (Le Gall 2007).
If  the subsidiary is an agent of  the parent, Article 7(2) of  the treaties 
requires the attribution of  the same profits to the subsidiary ‘that it might 
be expected to make if  it were a distinct and independent enterprise 
engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar 
conditions’. Arguably, the application of  UT satisfies this arm’s length 
condition, because in the absence of  precise comparables, which almost 
never exist, it is not possible to determine exactly what profits would have 
been attributable to the subsidiary under SA. 
When the US adopted the Comparable Profit Method and Profit Split 
in the 1994 transfer pricing regulations, some countries objected that it 
was violating the treaties because these methods did not rely on exact 
comparables to find the arm’s length price. However, these objections 
eventually subsided, and the OECD endorsed similar methods in its 
transfer pricing guidelines, and more recently granted them equivalent 
status to the traditional methods. The US has always maintained that 
both the Comparable Profit and Profit Split Methods satisfy the arm’s 
length standard despite the lack of  precise comparables (and in the 
case of  profit split, using no comparables at all to allocate any residual 
profits). Similarly, the US has maintained that the ‘super-royalty rule’ 
of  the Internal Revenue Code section 482 (which requires royalties to 
be ‘commensurate with the income’ from an intangible, and therefore 
subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with the arm’s length 
standard, even though no comparables can be found to show that such 
adjustments are ever made by unrelated parties.
Before the recent changes to the OECD Model Convention (MC), it 
was therefore quite plausible to argue that UT was compatible with the 
treaties if  the subsidiary were as a factual matter legally or economically 
dependent on the parent so as to constitute a PE. In addition, a country 
that wished to adopt UT could rely on the language of  the OECD MC 
Article 7(4): ‘Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to 
determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment on 
the basis of  an apportionment of  the total profits of  the enterprise to its 
various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting 
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State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment 
as may be necessary; the method of  apportionment adopted shall, 
however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the principles 
contained in this Article’.
Since it can be argued that in the absence of  comparables the result 
reached under UT is equivalent to what could be reached under SA, this 
language seems to permit the use of  UT for dependent agent PEs. 
However, the OECD in 2010 adopted changes to Article 7 of  the MC 
that would make this argument more difficult to sustain. Specifically, the 
OECD adopted the ‘authorised OECD approach’ to the attribution of  
profits to a PE, which treats a PE as the equivalent to a subsidiary, and 
has suggested that the transfer pricing guidelines that explicitly reject 
UT should be applied to PEs. In addition, the OECD has followed the 
US lead and deleted Article 7(4) from its MC. However, not all OECD 
countries accepted these changes, which were also rejected by developing 
countries, and the UN model still contains Article 7(4).
In fact, the vast majority of  existing actual treaties have not been revised 
to incorporate those changes. In particular, our research shows that many 
developing country treaties contain Article 7(4), even when the treaties 
are with OECD members.6 We identified 174 such treaties by developing 
countries that contain this language, including recent treaties such as 
India-Lithuania (2011), India-Nepal (2011), Korea-Panama (2010), and 
treaties with OECD members such as India-Sweden, India-UK, Mexico-
UK, and Sri Lanka-US. In all of  those cases, or in the absence of  a 
treaty, countries should be free to implement UT in accordance with the 
analysis set out above. 
Customary international law
Nor does the argument of  customary international law impede the 
application of  a UT approach. The argument is based on the contention 
that because SA and the ALS are embodied in all the treaties, they 
should be considered binding. But embodiment in the treaties is not 
enough to create a customary international law ban on UT, since Article 
7(4) is embodied as well. Furthermore, it should be noted that model tax 
treaties do not, in any way or form, create a ‘right to tax’.7 The key issue 
is the actual practice of  states – what countries actually do – as domestic 
laws reign supreme in the area of  taxation, and many of  them follow UT 
approaches in practice. In addition, countries should be free to follow the 
UN Model, which does not adopt the changes made by the OECD, and 
which is also widely followed.
Finally, it can be argued that even the OECD may be revising its 
approach. The authorised OECD approach may have marked the high 
point of  OECD commitment to SA. With the unfolding of  the base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project,8 which is influenced by large 
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developing countries like China and India, it is possible that the OECD 
may be stepping back from its total commitment to SA. Specifically, 
the adoption under BEPS of  country-by-country reporting (which was 
already required for extractive industries in the US) can be the basis 
for implementation of  UT.9 This development is very important for 
developing counties, as many rely heavily on extractive industries. The 
requirements of  country-by-country reporting will allow a profound 
change in taxation of  the major industry in the developing world: the 
extractive industry.
Does Article 7 preclude application of UT to entire MNEs?
One important question raised by Durst (Durst 2013a: 8) is whether 
the requirement that profits be attributable to a PE under Article 7 of  
the model treaties means that if  UT is applied, it must be done on an 
activity-by-activity basis. Otherwise, profits would be attributed to the 
PE that have nothing to do with it, because the PE is not engaged in 
the activity that generates these profits. However, one would rather not 
make this assumption, because allowing an MNE to split its activities 
among different subsidiaries is notoriously hard to combat, and facilitates 
precisely the kind of  profit shifting that developing countries, in 
particular, have a hard time policing.
In our opinion, the phrase ‘attributable to a permanent establishment’ 
does not preclude attribution of  global profits of  an MNE to a PE under 
whatever formula is adopted for UT purposes. The reason is that once a 
functional analysis is performed, and whatever can be attributed to the 
various functions by using either comparables or a proxy, such as a fixed 
percentage of  costs (Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst 2009), the remaining 
residual can be allocated in any way we wish, since it is attributable to the 
entire MNE.
Transfer pricing adjustments frequently result in a residual that cannot 
be allocated under the traditional functional analysis, because it results 
from cost savings that inhere in the relationship of  the group members 
to each other. The classic example is the US case involving Bausch and 
Lomb (B and L).10 B and L developed an unpatented technology that 
enabled it to manufacture contact lenses at a cost of  $2.50 per lens, 
when its competitors had costs of  $7.50 per lens. B and L contributed 
the knowhow to its Irish subsidiary, to enable it to manufacture the 
lenses. The question facing the US court was whether to accept B and 
L’s view that the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method should apply 
to determine the price charged by the Irish subsidiary to its parent for 
lenses based on a comparison with prices charged by independent lens 
manufacturers, despite the difference in production costs. The IRS 
argued that the residual profit from the know-how belonged to the US 
parent that developed it, but the court rejected that view because the 
residual profit inhered in the relationship between the parties. Had B and 
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L Ireland been unrelated to its parent, the know-how would have been 
disclosed, the competitors would have used it, and the residual profit 
would have disappeared.
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not say what should be done 
with residuals under the Profit Split Method. The US regulations followed 
the White Paper,11 in assuming that any residual results from intangibles 
and allocating the residual to where the intangibles were developed. This 
is a view that favours US revenue interests, because more intangibles 
are developed in the US than elsewhere, but not surprisingly it has not 
been accepted by other OECD members. Nor is it congruent with the 
facts, since residuals can result from other reasons, such as cost savings 
from synergies or advantages of  scale, and they usually inhere in the 
relationship among the group members and cannot be allocated to any 
one of  them.
The OECD’s preferred method of  applying the Profit Split Method is to 
analyse the functions, assets and risk of  each member of  the affiliated 
group. However, in the context of  residuals this method also proves to 
be illusory. A functional analysis can only be applied to those functions 
that can be assigned to the group members, such as production or 
distribution, but it does not help with residuals that result from the 
relationship among the group members. Assets can include intangibles, 
which are usually the most valuable assets of  a modern MNE, but 
intangibles also get their value from the relationship among the group 
members, as illustrated by the B and L case. This makes it very difficult 
for them to be allocated to either where they were developed or where 
they are exploited. The Glaxo case, in which the IRS and HMRC 
disagreed about whether the profit from selling Zantac, a drug developed 
in the UK, into the US market were attributable to the intangibles 
embodied in the drug itself  or those used in Glaxo’s marketing, resulted 
in massive double taxation.12
Risk is the trickiest concept of  all. Recent case studies by the US Joint 
Committee on Taxation (US Congress 2010) reveal a model in which 
the entrepreneurial risk for a product is assigned to an affiliate in a 
low tax jurisdiction, and the manufacturing and distribution of  the 
product in high tax jurisdictions are done on a contract manufacturing 
and commissionaire basis. But it is not clear what the allocation of  
entrepreneurial risk means among related parties. If  a product fails 
because of  technological change or defects in manufacturing or 
environmental hazards, the risk is effectively borne by the entire MNE – 
or more accurately by its management, who risk being fired, and by its 
shareholders, who see the stock price plummet.
Under UT, these issues can be solved by using the formula to allocate 
the residual by the Profit Split Method. The specific formula used can 
be negotiated, as discussed in other chapters in this book, and by Durst 
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(2014c). But in our opinion it is clear that whatever formula is decided 
upon should be applied under UT to the entire profit of  the integrated 
MNE, and not divided into separate activities, and that this would be 
perfectly congruent with Article 7.
UT and developing countries 
What can a developing country do to implement UT? In the absence of  
a treaty, or in the event that the treaty contains Article 7(4) language, the 
biggest obstacle to UT implementation may be access to information.
The recent redraft of  the UN Transfer Pricing Manual recommends that 
among the documentation that a tax administration should request 
for a transfer pricing audit should be the ‘Group global consolidated 
basis profit and loss statement and ratio of  taxpayer’s sales towards 
group global sales for five years’ (para. 8.6.9.12). This provides a good 
basis for application of  UT. The development of  a global template 
for country-by-country reports by MNEs, mandated by the G20 and 
developed as part of  the OECD’s BEPS project, would also facilitate 
such an approach. The rejection of  UT in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines is based on its definition of  formulary apportionment as 
‘applying a formula fixed in advance’. This leaves considerable scope for 
adoption of  UT approaches with ad hoc formulas, which are not based 
on a fixed formula.
Specifically, allocation according to operating expenses would be clearer 
and easier to administer, and most importantly would fit within the 
current rules of  international tax. We have argued that in the context 
of  the Profit Split Method, the residual profit cannot be allocated on the 
basis of  comparables, and therefore can be allocated based on operating 
expenses without deviating from the ALS (Avi-Yonah et al. 2009). This 
would entail first assigning to each country an estimated market return 
on the tax deductible expenses incurred by the multinational group in 
that country.
Developing countries should therefore be encouraged to draft their 
transfer pricing laws to include powers to adjust the accounts of  any 
foreign-owned local company or branch, if  the revenue authority 
considers that its accounts do not fairly reflect the profits earned locally, 
to bring the taxable profits into line with those that such a business would 
be expected to earn, having regard to (a) similar businesses either in that 
country or elsewhere, and/or (b) the relationship of  the local business 
to the worldwide activities of  the corporate group of  which it is a part. 
This would involve analysis and comparison of  provisions in the tax 
laws of  appropriate countries. A good model would be Section 482 of  
the US Internal Revenue Code, which predates the ALS and is very 
open-ended.13
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Conclusion
The transition from SA to UT is likely to be a long process, and it may 
ultimately require renegotiating treaties or even drafting a multilateral 
treaty like the EU’s Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. 
However, a good beginning can be made now by exploring how 
developing countries can adopt UT principles within the context of  the 
existing treaty network. This paper has endeavoured to show that such 
approaches are quite feasible, because most developing countries are 
not bound by the authorised OECD approach to Article 7, and even 
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